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ABSTRACT 
 
We examine the implications of search unemployment for the evaluation of a transport in-
vestment in a conventional cost benefit analysis (CBA) assuming perfect competition. Lower 
transport costs induces search over a larger area and longer commuting distances. The ex-
pected duration of vacancies is reduced with ensuing benefits outweighing the loss to in-
creased transport. The search imperfection drives a wedge between the marginal product of 
labour and the wage, such that the final benefits of a transport improvement exceed those of a 
conventional CBA. Using a simulation model we find these additional benefits may be sub-
stantial. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of a labour market search imperfec-
tion on the results of a conventional cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of a transport improvement. 
Conventional CBA generally assumes perfect competition in non-transport sectors. This is 
convenient since it allows the analysis to be based on the market for transport alone, consid-
ering only the direct transport impacts. 
However, with imperfect competition in non-transport sectors it is no longer adequate to 
base the analysis only on the market for transport. There will be effects on other markets such 
as those for housing, labour and goods (Kidokoro 2004) that may be significant for the con-
clusion of the analysis. Thus, as noted by DETR (1999), the value of the direct transport im-
pacts will not be the same as the value of final economic impacts. Therefore, conventional 
CBA may be misleading when the effects of market imperfections are large. 
A potentially significant imperfection occurs in labour markets, which are characterised 
by the presence of unemployment. This paper formulates a small spatial computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model with a labour market search imperfection leading to unemploy-
ment. We implement a transport improvement in this model and compare the full welfare ef-
fect under the model to the effect that would be obtained from a conventional CBA. Thus the 
contribution of this paper is to point out the potential significance of labour market effects 
relative to the conventional CBA. We find that additional labour market benefits may be sub-
stantial in relation to the direct user benefits.  
This paper adds to a growing literature on imperfections relative to conventional CBA. 
These studies are rooted in New Economic Geography, see for example Krugman (1991) and 
Fujita et al (2000). Venables and Gasiorek (1999) examine imperfect competition in the 
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transport using sector in a regional model. Industries exhibit increasing returns to scale and a 
transport cost reduction leads to industry rationalisation. Furthermore they include pro-
competitive effects as firms can more easily compete in different regions when transport 
costs are reduced. Finally they study effects of linkages and agglomeration between firms and 
industrial and regional heterogeneity. Using constructed data they find that the real income 
gains from transport improvements typically exceed those computed by the standard CBA 
technique by 30-50 per cent, where the magnitude depends on different assumptions and pa-
rameters.  
Venables (2007) argues in favour of productivity effects related to agglomeration. City 
size is regulated by two opposing forces: First, workers are more productive in a larger city 
which leads to agglomeration. Second, this force is balanced by the increase in commuting 
costs due to congestion. When congestion costs are reduced, the city may become larger and 
productivity may increase. The productivity increase is additional to the benefits accounted 
for in conventional CBA. This effect is reinforced by distortionary income taxation, which 
drives a wedge between the marginal product of labour and the net wage. Venables finds with 
some qualifications that the total benefit of reducing commuting costs may be several times 
larger than the reduction in commuting costs. 
In this paper we introduce unemployment and let workers decide the area over which to 
search based on commuting costs. A reduction in commuting costs induces unemployed 
workers to search over larger areas. This reduces the average duration of unemployment 
spells and hence leads to increased employment. 
Thus we have several sources of additional benefits relative to conventional CBA. Each 
may be quantitatively significant. An important question is then how these sources interact. 
We will seek to provide some intuition on this issue in our concluding remarks, but we focus 
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on illustrating the effect of the labour market search imperfection. Hence we do not include 
the complication of other imperfections on our model. 
The layout of this paper is as follows. In section 2.0 we provide a more detailed discus-
sion of search unemployment in relation to transport. Section 3.0 introduces the CGE model 
and in section 4.0 we discuss the effects that are found in the CGE model compared to the ef-
fects covered by the standard CBA in the case of an infrastructure investment. Section 5.0 re-
ports some simulation results. Finally section 6.0 concludes. 
 
2.0 SEARCH IMPERFECTIONS ON THE LABOUR MARKET AND TRANSPORT 
It is a prominent feature of the labour market that it is in a state of permanent flux. Jobs 
are constantly being destroyed while new jobs are created elsewhere. For US manufacturing 
during 1973-1988, Davis et al. (1997) finds that 10.3 per cent of all jobs are destroyed annu-
ally, while at the same time 9.1 per cent new jobs are created elsewhere. The difference re-
flects decreasing total employment in US manufacturing during that period. For Denmark, 
Albæk and Sørensen (1998) finds even higher rates of job turnover during 1980-1991: at least 
12 per cent new jobs are created while 11.5 per cent of the existing jobs are destroyed. This 
creates large gross flows in and out of jobs. The average worker has a high probability of ex-
periencing an unemployment spell.  
Workers and firms do not have perfect information. Therefore it takes a while for un-
employed workers and jobs to match, even though there is simultaneously unemployment and 
vacant jobs. This form of unemployment is termed search unemployment and is an important 
part of structural unemployment. This labour market imperfection can be seen to be fairly 
important considering that the structural unemployment rate is well above zero in most coun-
tries. 
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Search unemployment has been studied by several authors, notably Pissarides (1990, 
2000) who presents a consistent equilibrium theory of search unemployment. This framework 
is applied in this paper. 
Search imperfections on the labour market are closely linked to transport. The funda-
mental imperfection causing unemployment is the lack of the information necessary in order 
to clear the labour market at each instant. Search imperfections may have as a consequence 
that there may be more commuting than would be the case under perfect information. This 
implies a loss relative to the case of perfect competition. Furthermore, changes in transport 
costs may affect the size of this loss with implications for cost-benefit analysis. The basic in-
tuition of this is the following. 
In a perfect competition world, a worker would have full information and choose his 
job optimally. In this world we could infer that his additional benefit of accepting a job far 
away rather than near to home outweighs his additional commuting costs, since otherwise he 
would not have accepted the job with higher commuting costs. This observation is at the heart 
of standard welfare economic analysis of transport investments under the assumption of per-
fect competition. 
This conclusion is no longer valid when we allow for a search imperfection. When a 
worker becomes unemployed, he must decide how far away he is willing to search for a job. 
But now this involves a choice between uncertain alternatives. If the worker chooses to 
search only locally, he does not risk incurring high commuting costs but the expected dura-
tion of his unemployment spell may be long. Conversely, if he increases his search area he 
may reduce the expected duration of his unemployment spell at the cost of a risk of incurring 
higher commuting costs. On balance we may assume that the worker chooses his search area 
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such as to balance the benefit of reducing the expected duration of unemployment with the 
expected cost of commuting.  
The worker chooses his ex ante search strategy optimally but the ex post outcome may 
not be optimal. It may happen that a worker accepts a remote job with high commuting costs, 
while a nearby job with lower commuting costs would entail a higher net utility. 
Thus an investment leading to reduced commuting costs may lead to increased commut-
ing which entails a cost, not a benefit as would be inferred assuming perfect competition. The 
loss from increased commuting is offset by reduced duration of unemployment spells and 
hence a reduced level of unemployment. 
 
3.0 THE MODEL  
We formulate a general equilibrium model describing, in principle, the behaviour of all 
relevant agents of the economy. The equilibrium conditions of all markets are fully described 
such that the second order effects of a given policy change are included. The model is formu-
lated dynamically and solved in steady state. 
The model describes commuting transport in a small open economy with two identical 
regions characterized by search imperfections on the labour market (following Pissarides 
(2000)).2 The agents in the model are utility-maximising households/workers, profit-
maximising firms and a government. There is also a union in each region which negotiates 
the local wage. The model is described in the following sections.  
                                                 
2 This model was used in another version in Pilegaard (2003). 
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3.1   The Households 
We identify a household with a worker, who consumes goods, c, and pure leisure, l. 
There is a continuum of workers, indexed by ν∈[0:1] living in each region. At the same time, 
we take ν as the individual exogenous evaluation of pure leisure relative to consumption and 
consequently also the individual value of time. We assume a separable linear utility function 
( ) lcl,cu ⋅ν+=ν  .      ( 1 ) 
The consumption of goods and leisure is restricted by budget constraints for time and 
money. The demand for commuting emerges from the need to go to work to earn the wage w, 
and thereby increase the consumption of goods. A worker can be employed in his residential 
region or in the neighbouring region. Job characteristics are identical in the two regions but 
commuting to the neighbouring region is more time consuming than commuting to a job in 
the residential region since the distance is longer. To simplify we assume that a worker has 
only commuting costs associated with commuting time from region i to region j, denoted by 
com
ji,l .  
We assume that goods are consumed instantaneously without any use of time. There-
fore, the total time endowment, l , is spent working the hours a, on commuting and on lei-
sure. The residual leisure for a worker living in region i is given by: 
  ⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ =
−−==
unemployedifll
jregioninemployediflall
l u
i
com
j,ij,i
e
    ( 2 ) 
All workers receive a lump sum transfer τ from the government and unemployed work-
ers additionally receive the benefit b. There is no income tax in the model as it would obscure 
the main insights of interest. Letting pc be the consumer price on consumption goods, the 
money budget restriction for a worker living in region i is therefore given by: 
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A worker who searches for a job in region j finds employment in j at the rate ρj. At the 
same time, the employed workers in j are laid off from work at the rate s j. These transition 
rates are the same for all workers and hence everybody experiences both employment and 
unemployment at some point in time. The model excludes on-the-job search and a job change 
therefore only takes place after a worker has been laid off.  
An unemployed worker must choose a search strategy among two possibilities: under 
strategy h he only searches for a job in the region where he is resident, while under strategy b 
he searches in both regions. Under strategy h, he will never incur the high commuting costs, 
but the expected duration of unemployment is longer.  
A worker chooses a search strategy to maximise the expected present value of his fu-
ture utility using the discount rate δ. We can determine the value νi* of ν that makes a worker 
living in region i indifferent between the two search strategies by equating the expected pre-
sent values under the two strategies. This νi* is determined by the relation 
  
)ll(
s
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i
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i
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ρ+−
−=ν .     ( 4 ) 
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For any ν>νi*, that is, for any worker in i with a higher valuation of leisure, it will be 
preferable to search only in the region where he is resident. The opposite holds for the con-
sumers with ν<νi* . 3 
The numerator in ( 4 ), ui
e
j,i CC − , is the gain in consumption from being employed in 
the neighbouring region compared to being unemployed. Similarly, the denominator equals 
the total discounted expected loss in leisure of being employed in the neighbouring region 
relative to being unemployed and searching only locally. When determining whether to 
search in the neighbouring region or not, the surplus (or loss) of getting a job in the 
neighbouring region is compared to the expectation of the surplus of being employed in the 
residential region. Hence, the probability of being employed in the neighbouring region does 
not affect νi*. Basically, the worker trades off the additional commuting time with the chance 
of reducing the unemployment spell. 
3.2   The Firms 
Firms produce with labour as the only input and decreasing marginal productivity. The 
representative firm in i lays off employees at the exogenous rate si as described earlier. When 
firms want to hire more workers they have to open vacancies. A vacancy is paired with an 
unemployed worker at the rate qi. The vacancies, Oi, are costly to the firms; each has a fixed 
cost, σ2. 
                                                 
3 We have assumed that the regions are identical, that jobs have the same characteristics and that commuting costs are only 
related to the use of time. Relaxing these assumptions will affect the expression for νi*. 
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The firms are small without market power. This implies that they take the output price 
as given. The workers are homogenous from the firms' point of view, no matter where they 
live. Therefore, a firm is only interested in its total number of workers, Ni. The change in a 
firm's employment from one period to the next is given by the number of newly employed 
workers minus the number of laid off workers. The number of firms in each region is normal-
ised to 1 with no loss of generality. 
We assume a small open economy. A perfect substitute for the domestically produced 
consumption commodity is produced abroad at the world market price. The output price of 
the firms is therefore exogenous. 
The problem for a representative firm located in region i is to choose the number of job 
openings to maximise the present value of expected future profits given the dynamic change 
in employment. Solving the firm's problem leads to the steady state first order condition say-
ing that the firms employ workers until the value of the marginal product of labour equals the 
sum of the wage and the expected value of production losses caused by laying off workers 
and hiring costs. This implies that the imperfections in the labour market drive a wedge be-
tween the value of the marginal product and the wage.  
3.3  Matching Workers and Jobs  
Since the firms consider all workers as homogenous, all unemployed workers searching 
for a job in a region have the same probability of being hired in this region. At any point in 
time, the number of matches Mi, or the number of newly occupied jobs in region i, is assumed 
to be a function of the number of unemployed workers looking for a job in region i, the job 
candidates Zi , and the number of vacancies. We assume that these are matched by a Cobb-
Douglas technology, ii iiii OZM
ηηφ −⋅⋅= 1 , where φi is a parameter. 
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The rate at which a firm gets a vacant job occupied, qi , is the ratio of job matches to 
job openings: Mi /Oi ≡ qi. The more candidates relative to job openings, the easier it is for the 
firms to get the job matched and the shorter is the expected duration of the vacancy, 1/qi. 
Similarly, the rate at which the unemployed workers find jobs in region i is given by the ratio 
of matches to job candidates: Mi /Zi ≡ ρi. The more job openings relative to job candidates, 
the easier it is for an unemployed worker to find work and the shorter is the expected duration 
of the unemployment spell, 1/ρi. 
The unemployment of workers depends on where they live and their search strategy (h 
or b). Uih is the number of unemployed workers living in i searching only in their residential 
region while Uib  is the number of unemployed workers living in i and searching in both re-
gions. Ni,ih and Ni,jb are the corresponding numbers of workers employed in i and j with each 
search strategy. The change in unemployment for the group of workers with a given search 
behaviour is the sum of the number of newly laid off workers minus the number of newly 
hired workers. In steady state this change must equal zero such that the number of unem-
ployed workers equals the average number of laid off workers times the average length of an 
unemployment spell. 
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Similarly one can find the steady state employment for the groups of workers: 
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Since all workers with ν<νi* will search in both regions while workers with ν>ν i* will 
search only in their region of residence, the equilibrium conditions for the groups of workers 
are given by: 
  
*UN
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i
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i
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i
b
j,i
b
i,i
ν−=+
ν=++
1
      ( 7 ) 
3.4   Wage Formation 
It is assumed that the wage is determined in a Nash bargaining process between the 
firms and a representative union member who negotiates a single wage that does not compen-
sate for differences in commuting costs. Therefore, we may assume that the union member 
represents only the resident workers, who are also the majority of the labour force in the re-
gion.  
In the bargaining they share the benefits that occur when a vacant worker and a vacancy 
is matched. Therefore, the wage will deviate both from the marginal cost of labour and from 
the reservation costs of the workers, that is the costs of being employed relative to being un-
employed.  
Even though wage formation is endogenous, changes in commuting costs will cause 
real utility changes both for intra- and inter-regional commuters; inter-regional commuters 
because they cover the commuting costs themselves; intra-regional commuters through the 
benefit sharing in the wage bargaining process. 
3.5   The Government 
The government supplies a public good, raises taxes and pays benefits to the unem-
ployed workers. The government raises taxes from commodity consumption and expropriates 
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all profits from the firms. Finally, the government balances the budget with a lump sum trans-
fer to all workers in the economy.  
The supply of the public good is assumed constant and it does not increase the utility of 
the workers. The government finances the transport infrastructure, which is free for use. It is 
assumed that the costs of maintaining the infrastructure are constant and independent of use 
or, alternatively, that the public consumption in total is constant and that increases in road in-
frastructure maintenance costs are counterbalanced by a cut in other public consumption. 
 
4.0 WELFARE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS  
Having formulated the economic model, we proceed by defining an infrastructure in-
vestment for which the welfare economic analysis is performed. 
4.1   An Infrastructure Investment 
We assume that the interregional road is improved such that the interregional commut-
ing time is reduced by 10 per cent. To simplify the analysis we assume that the investment is 
financed via the lump sum tax. Since this tax is non-distortionary we can simply set the in-
vestment cost to zero. This allows us to focus on the benefits of the investment and is no re-
striction on results. 
4.2   Illustration of the difference between CGE and CBA Results 
In applied CBA, the assumption is routinely made that benefits to travellers is repre-
sented by the change in consumer surplus, that is the change in the areas below the demand 
curves for each link in a network (Kidokoro 2004). This benefit comprises the cost saving to 
existing travellers plus an additional benefit to newly generated travellers. This is illustrated 
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by the areas of a and b in Figure 1. This assumption may be justified by the assumption of 
perfect competition (see for example Jara-Diaz 1986, Fosgerau and Kristensen 2005). Given 
our assumptions, the direct effect of a transport investment consists only of the change in 
transport demand. There is no direct effect on the government revenue or behaviour of the 
firms. Thus, the CBA in our model consists only of the consumer’s surplus (CS). 
However, when search unemployment is considered, this conclusion is no longer valid. 
There are two main modifying effects. Both may be substantial and they can plausibly over-
shadow the consumer surplus. 
The first effect is that the transport improvement will induce workers who become un-
employed to search over a larger area. In equilibrium, a proportion of the new travellers on 
the improved link will then have exchanged a local job for a job further away from home. For 
the individual long distance commuting worker, this in itself entails no benefits, but instead a 
cost consisting of the difference in commuting cost between working locally and further 
away.  
However, the second effect is that the increased search activity reduces the unemployment 
rate by shortening the average duration of unemployment spells. This entails a benefit for 
each additional person who becomes employed for this reason as well as increased tax pay-
ments. Depending on the increase in employment this second effect may entail a large bene-
fit. 
Figure 2 a and b illustrate the effects for the employed and unemployed workers of an 
interregional commuting cost reduction in the situation with job search imperfections. In this 
example we set the regional commuting costs to zero. To further simplify the figures they il-
lustrate only partial effects, without general equilibrium reactions to prices and labour market 
responses on durations. The demand curves are approximated by straight lines. 
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Figure 2a illustrates how the distribution of workers from region i depends on the inter-
regional commuting costs. The number of both actual and potential interregional commuters 
( bi,i
b
j,i N,N and 
b
iU ) is decreasing in interregional commuting costs, while the number of em-
ployed and unemployed workers who will work only in their residential region is increasing 
in interregional commuting costs. b j,iN is the demand for inter-regional transport. In standard 
CBA we would just compute the change in the area under this curve. 
In Figure 2b we add the effects of reducing the interregional commuting costs (from 
0com
j,il  to 
1com
j,il ). The ex ante number of commuters 
0,b
j,iN  experience a saving of 
com
j,ilΔ , this 
benefit is represented by the square a. The number of interregional commuters increases 
when the interregional commuting costs are reduced. The new commuters, 01 ,b j,i
,b
j,i NN − , pay 
the additional commuting cost of 1comj,il . This is a loss since before they were resident workers 
and thus had zero commuting costs. The triangle b has no effect on the welfare. The increased 
search activity implies that the level of employment increases (by ΔN). This generates a so-
cial gain since the marginal product of labour is higher than the private cost of working. The 
total welfare effect of the commuting cost reduction is therefore the gain for the existing 
commuters (a) plus the net gain of the additional employment (d) minus the additional com-
muting costs for the new long distance commuters (c). 
The driver of the results here is that the increased willingness to search in the 
neighbouring region increases the total employment. This can easily be seen in the Figure 2 
since hi,i
b
i,i
b
j,i NNN ++ is decreasing in comj,il .  Thus, the increase in employment among work-
ers who are now willing to work in the neighbouring region, is larger than the reduction in 
employment of workers, who are willing to work only in the residential region. This is the 
same as to say that the total unemployment decreases. Total unemployment U is the sum of 
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unemployment of workers who are willing to search in both regions and who are only willing 
to search residentially: Ui=Uib+Uih. Using equations ( 5Error! Reference source not found. 
) and ( 6 ) the number of unemployed workers in each of the groups is given by:  
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    ( 8 ) 
Since a decrease in interregional travel costs (li,jcom) increases ν i* it is now easy to see 
that the total effect on unemployment of a travel cost reduction is negative. 
  0
2
>⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+−+= comj,i
i
com
j,i
i
dl
*d
s
s
s
s
dl
dU ν
ρρ      ( 9 ) 
The social benefit of an additional worker being employed instead of being unem-
ployed is the marginal product of labour minus the value of working time for the marginal 
worker. As described earlier, the marginal product of labour is higher than the real wage 
since the firms have to take into account their search costs of hiring new workers when de-
termining on their employment level. 
When we expand the analysis to include general equilibrium effects we will also see re-
actions in the matching rates ρ and q. This changes the slopes of the curves in the figure and 
will typically reduce the effects. We find in our application, that the equilibrium effects on 
the duration of an unemployment period and a vacancy are small which implies that the in-
duced effects on the curves would be small as well. 
4.3   Welfare Effects 
In the CGE model, the welfare effects can be measured by the Equivalent Variation 
(EV). EV measures the money transfer (positive or negative) that a consumer should receive 
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in the initial situation to be indifferent between accepting this transfer and experiencing the 
policy change.  
In this simple CGE model, the EV is found by: 
  
001 Cp)uu(EV −=       ( 10 ) 
where u is the average total utility that the consumers experience and 0,cp is the initial con-
sumer price level. Here the EV is defined as the per period payment and not as a one-time to-
tal payment. Therefore, we also calculate the consumer surplus per period.  
4.4   Calculating the Consumers Surplus 
When calculating the CS it is normally assumed that the demand curve for travel is ap-
proximately linearly downward sloping in generalised travel costs. Letting N0 and l0 respec-
tively N1 and l1 be the number of travellers and the travel time before respectively after the 
policy change and VoT be the value of time. Then the CS is calculated using the rule of-a-
half. 
  ( )0110 )(½ NNVoTllCS +⋅⋅−⋅=      ( 11 ) 
In this approximation it is assumed that the value of time is identical – or identically 
distributed – for all travellers. However, each traveller has an individual value of time in our 
model and the average VoT for a group of travellers changes systematically when the group 
of travellers changes. Therefore it is problematic to assume a constant average VoT. In a bet-
ter approximation the individual value of time must to be taken into account.  
In the appendix we show that when the distribution of the individual values of time is 
taken into account, then the CS in our model may be approximated by: 
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 ( )001110 VoTNVoTN)ll(½CS b j,ib j,icomj,icomj,ij,i ⋅+⋅⋅−⋅=     ( 12 ) 
 
5.0 EMPIRICAL ILLUSTRATION 
5.1   The Simulation Model 
In order to implement the model, we insert numbers such that the model reproduces 
some main features of the Danish Economy. Here, we give a brief overview of the main pa-
rameters.  
The time period is one year. The number of workers in each region is normalised to 1. 
We fix the interest rate at r=0.08, the discount factor at δ=0.1 and the rate with which workers 
are laid off at s=0.1. The matching parameter is chosen to be η=0.65, which implies that the 
negative externalities firms cause each other are larger than the negative externalities that 
searching workers cause each other. The interregional commuting time per work day is 94 
minutes per day, while the intraregional commuting time is 40 minutes per day. In the model, 
28.7 per cent of workers commute ex ante and the ex ante unemployment rate is 6 per cent. 
The rate of consumption tax is set to 25 per cent, which is the current rate of VAT in Den-
mark.  
The ex ante output per region is 450,000 DKK4 per year, which is close to the actual 
Danish GDP per worker. The ex ante wage is 180,000 DKK, the lump sum transfer is 17,500 
DKK and the unemployment benefit is 36,300 DKK per year. The ex ante consumption per 
                                                 
4 1 Euro = 7.5 DKK. 
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region of 190,000 DKK per year is equal to the actual Danish annual private consumption per 
worker. 
 
5.3   Results 
In table 1 we report the results of a 10 per cent reduction in interregional commuting 
time in the model. The welfare effects are calculated both as EV and as the direct effects in a 
CBA (CS). We have calculated the CS taking into account the individual value of time using 
(12). 
The consumer surplus per person is 246 DKK, while the equivalent variation is 318 
DKK.5 Thus, this simulation indicates substantial indirect effects of 29 per cent on top of the 
consumer surplus.  
It is informative to decompose the CS and the EV into parts: the direct effect of the 
travel time change and the indirect effects. The CS consists of a direct travel time benefit to 
ex ante commuters of 228 DKK plus a benefit to new commuters of 18 DKK, the latter corre-
sponding to area (b) in Figure 1. In the EV calculation, the benefit to new commuters is re-
placed by a loss due to additional commuting time costs of 181, corresponding to area (c) in 
Figure 1.  
                                                 
5 We can roughly relate the consumer surplus to the commuting time saving as follows. A worker commutes 225 days per 
year and the daily two-way commuting time for inter-regional commuters is 94 minutes, which is reduced by 10 per cent. 
The 28.7 per cent of the population who are inter-regional commuters have ex ante an average value of time of 22.6 DKK 
per hour; this value is low since it is the workers with the lowest value of time who commute inter-regionally in the model. 
With these numbers we would find a total value of the travel time reduction of 228 DKK per person.   
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However, this loss is more than compensated by the indirect effects. Increased con-
sumption leads to a gain of 415 DKK, while increased employment leads to a loss of leisure 
worth 143 DKK, leading to a total indirect effect of 271 DKK.  
5.4   Sensitivity 
The figures in Table 1 result from a single set of parameters. The exact relation between 
EV and CBA depends on many aspects in the details of the model formulation as well as the 
calibration. However, a larger wedge between the real wage and the marginal product of la-
bour generally increases the ratio between the EV and the CS. A higher value of time in-
creases directly all elements of the benefit calculation that are related to time, while the share 
from consumption goods in the EV calculation is unaffected by first order effects. As the sum 
of these is negative in the EV and positive in CS, an increase in the value of time will then 
reduce the ratio between the EV and the CS.  
 
6.0 CONCLUDING REMARKS  
In this paper we have found that in a situation where the labour market is subject to 
search imperfection there could be substantial welfare effects omitted when evaluating the ef-
fects of an infrastructure improvement only by the direct transport cost effects.  
The general level of structural employment in most countries suggests that the omitted 
effects are in fact important and deserve more attention. A vital task is then to provide more 
empirical evidence with the ultimate goal of including labour market imperfections in project 
evaluation.  
 21  
It is an important feature of the model that it explicitly takes into account the relation be-
tween transport and the labour market, something which is often seen as central by politi-
cians, but which conventional cost-benefit analysis fails to do. 
An important driver for the result that the equivalent variation is higher than the con-
sumer surplus of the conventional CBA, is that the marginal productivity of a worker is 
higher than the real wage. This implies that there are benefits of increased employment that 
the individuals do not take into account. This difference between the real wage and the mar-
ginal product of labour is a consequence of the search imperfection in our model.  
A difference between the marginal product of labour and the real wage is also found in 
other models with imperfections on the labour market; for example when there is a positive 
labour income tax or if there are agglomeration productivity effects. In such a model there 
will also be benefits of employment that the individual worker does not take into account 
when deciding his behaviour and therefore it would also be the case that the EV exceeds the 
direct effects covered by the CBA (Venables 2007). 
One may ask what is the interaction between the effect of the search imperfection de-
scribed in this paper and the agglomeration benefits described by Venables (2007).6 We sug-
gest the interaction will be positive for the following reason. Consider a large city with ag-
glomeration productivity effects as one of the regions in our model. If the commuting costs to 
the large city are reduced, then the reduction in search employment will increase employment 
in the city. The cost reduction also leads to increased employment in the city due to the ag-
glomeration effect. But the increase in employment in the city due to the decrease in general 
                                                 
6 This issue was raised by a referee. 
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unemployment will increase the level from which the agglomeration effect acts. Thus there is 
a second order effect which can be expected to be positive. 
Our model assumes that labour is homogenous, but increasing specialisation of the la-
bour force is argued to be a driver behind the tendency toward increased commuting dis-
tances observed in many countries. With differences in job characteristics a worker would 
face an additional trade-off between job characteristics and commuting costs. However, the 
wedge between the marginal product of labour and the real wage will still be present, such 
that the equivalent variation would still exceed the consumer surplus. A transport improve-
ment may lead to increased quality of the matches and hence increased productivity if work-
ers possess different skills, which would entail a further benefit.  
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Figure 1: Perfect competition 
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Figure 2b: Job search imperfections 
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Table 1: Welfare implications of a transport improvement 
 
10% reduction of interregional travel times
Annual effects: DKK
Equivalent variation, EV: 318.31
   share from commuting times: 46.94
 existing commuters 228.26
new commuters -181.32
   additional effects: 271.36
share from consumption goods 414.51
share from working times -143.14
Net present value CBA (=CS)
individual VoT 246.23
EV relative to CBA:
individual VoT 1.293
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APPENDIX A:  Calculation of the Consumer's surplus (CS) 
In the standard derivation of the CS we calculate the CS as the area below the demand 
curve. The demand curve is approximated by a downward sloping straight line thus we end 
up with the well known rule-of-a half. Letting l⁰ and l¹ be the travel time before and after the 
project, letting VoT be the value of time and letting N⁰ and N¹ be the number of travellers be-
fore and after the project, then this can be written as: 
  ( ) ( )1010
2
1 NNVoTllCS +⋅⋅−⋅=      (a.) 
In the derivation above it is assumed that all travellers have the same value of time. In 
the model used in this paper this is not the case. Here, the travellers have individual values of 
time. In a better approximation we have to take this into account. 
A.1   Calculation of CS in the model (formula (12)) 
To ease the reading we neglect the indices for residential and workplace region (i and j) 
in the following. 
Let l be a given travel time needed for interregional commuting. Assuming that the 
workers preference parameter ν is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, then ν*(l) of the 
workers are potentially willing to commute. All workers with a ν≤ν*(l) are willing to com-
mute while workers with a ν>ν*(l) are not willing to commute. 
For a given worker, with preference parameter ν, the probability of actually being a 
commuter given the travel time l is given by: 
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  ( ) ( )( )⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
>
≤+=
*
*
ls
l
,lp
νν
ννρ
ρ
ν
0
2      (b.) 
Note that the size of p(l,ν) defined above does not depend on ν. Thus, any worker will-
ing to commute has the same probability of actually being a commuter. It is only the marginal 
point for being a commuter that changes depending on ν. Let l*(ν) be the maximal distance 
that the worker with ν is willing to commute. We then have that ( ) 0<∂
∂
ν
ν*l . 
We now proceed to define the CS of travelling. To do this, we consider the two situa-
tions for a given travel time l: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) 0=⇒>⇒<
⋅−⋅=⇒≤⇒≥
l,CSl*l*l)b
,lpl*ll,CSl*l*l)a
νννν
ννννννν
     
There is no CS of travelling in situation b) since no workers with these preferences ac-
tually commute. To calculate the total CS we therefore only have to consider the situation a). 
    
( ) ( )( )
( )( )( ) ( ) ( ) ννννν
ν
ν
df,lpl*l
l,CSElCS
l*
⋅−⋅=
=
∫
0
     (c.) 
The density function f(ν)=1 since ν is assumed to be uniformly distributed from 0 to 1. 
We now use that the probability for being a commuter is the same for all workers with 
ν≤ν*(l) thus: 
    
( ) ( )( )( ) ( )
( )( )( ) ( )( ) νννν
νννν
ν
ν
dl*,lpl*l
d,lpl*llCS
l*
l*
⋅−⋅=
⋅−⋅=
∫
∫
0
0     (d.) 
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We note that this integral only depends on l. 
We now proceed by differentiating the CS(l) with respect to l: 
    
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )
( )( )( ) ννν
νννν
ν
dl*,lp
l*,lpll**ll*
l
l*
l
lCS
l*
∫ ⋅−
⋅−⋅∂
∂≅∂
∂
0
  (e.) 
where we have assumed that ( )( ) 0=∂
∂
l
l*,lp ν . With this simplification we neglect the second 
order effects on employment probabilities of changes in labour market behaviour. This is rea-
sonable since we look at marginal changes in l.  
Since l*( ν*(l))=l, (e.) can be rewritten to: 
    
( ) ( )( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )l*,lpl*
dl*,lp
l
lCS l*
νν
ννν
ν
⋅−=
⋅−=∂
∂ ∫
2
0
2
1
     (f.) 
Since p(l,ν*(l)) is the probability of being a commuter for all workers who are willing 
to commute and since ν*(l) is the proportion of the workers who are willing to commute then 
the actual number of commuters, Nb(l), for a given travel time are given by: 
   ( ) ( ) ( )( )l*,lpl*lN b νν ⋅=       (g.) 
Thus (f.) can be rewritten to: 
   ( ) ( ) ( )lNl*
l
lCS b⋅−=∂
∂ ν
2
1       (h.) 
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We finally use the approximation that ( )
l
lCS
∂
∂  is linear in l. We have tested the linearity 
by running a series of experiments with small changes in transport costs. Then the demand 
curves can be drawn and the linear approximation turns out to be reasonable for the relevant 
small policy changes. Then the change in CS(l), ΔCS, as a reduction of travel time from l⁰ to 
l¹ is approximately given by: 
( )
( )( )
( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−≅
⋅−=
∂
∂=
∫
∫
0
0
1
1
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1
2
1
1
0
1
0
bb
l
l
b
l
l
N*N*ll
dllN*
dl
l
lCSCS
νν
ν
Δ
    (i.) 
Since ν*/2 is the average VoT for the actual commuters this is the formula (12). 
 
 
